Full Service Law Firm in Mt. Laurel Township, NJ | Capehart Scatchard

negligence

Plaintiff Andris Arias fell in a hole and was injured while rollerblading on a paved pedestrian pathway in Van Saun County Park in Paramus.  The Park, owned by the County of Bergen, consisted of 130 acres of land.  The issue in Arias v. County of Bergen, 2024 N.J. Super. LEXIS 74 (App. Div. June 14, 2024) was whether the County had immunity under the Landowners Liability Act for this accident.

Under the Landowners Liability Act, certain owners, lessees and occupants of property owe no duty to persons injured while using property for recreational activities and are immune from suit.  N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-3.  This immunity is available to public entities.  The immunity is not available to persons or entities if there is a “willful or malicious failure to guard, or to warn against, a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity.” 

The plaintiff argued that the County was not entitled to immunity under this Act because the Park was located in a residential, suburban neighborhood and, therefore, did not qualify as “premises” protected by the Act.  The County, however, argued that the focus of the Act was the dominant character of the land and the Park, as a property containing recreational lands, was exactly the type of premises that the Act was created to protect. 

Here, the trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss, which order was appealed to the Appellate Division.  The Appellate Division upheld the dismissal of the complaint.  It found that under the “dominant character of the land analysis, it was undisputed that the Park offered the general public access to picnic areas, playgrounds, pavilions, athletic fields, wooded areas, bicycling and wooded paths, and the dog park – without charging a fee.”

The Court noted that the Park’s “dominant character as an open space for sport and recreational activities renders the Park the type of property entitled to protection” under the Landowners Liability Act.  Thus, it agreed with the trial court judge that the Park was a “premises” as defined by the Act and that the County was entitled to Landowners Liability Act immunity from this accident.  The Appellate Division also agreed that the motion was not premature and affirmed the trial court decision, dismissing the lawsuit. 

By: Victoria M. Adeleke, Law Clerk
Edited by: Betsy G. Ramos, Esq.

Plaintiffs Bridgewater Donuts, LLC and Tamar, Inc. filed a lawsuit against defendant Geico Indemnity Co. seeking coverage under an automobile liability policy issued to Susan Mendelsohn-Hall. Mendelsohn-Hall alleged she suffered injuries when hot tea spilled on her at the Dunkin’ Donuts drive-through, leading to a lawsuit against Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs then sought coverage under Mendelsohn-Hall’s auto policy issued by Geico, invoking the “loading and unloading” doctrine. However, Geico denied coverage, prompting this legal dispute. The issue in Bridgewater Donuts, LLC v. Geico Indemnity Co., 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1505 (App. Div.  July 9, 2024) was whether Plaintiffs qualified as additional insured under Mendelsohn-Hall’s auto policy under the loading and unloading doctrine.

Mendelsohn-Hall had a New Jersey Family Automobile Insurance policy that provided coverage for bodily injury sustained by a person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile. The policy defined the persons insured to include Mendelsohn-Hall and any other person using the auto with her permission.

On the day of the accident, Mendelsohn alleged she was scalded by hot tea as it was delivered to her at the drive thru window by plaintiffs’ employees and that her injuries were proximately caused by plaintiffs’ negligence.  

Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendant Geico, seeking a declaratory judgment that they were additional insureds under Mendelsohn-Hall’s policy. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing plaintiffs had not been using Mendelsohn-Hall’s vehicle when she sustained her injuries and, therefore, were not additionally insured as users of the automobile. The trial court granted Geico’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint. The trial court determined that Plaintiffs did not qualify as additional insureds under Mendelsohn-Hall’s auto policy because her injuries were not directly attributable to the loading of the tea by plaintiffs into her vehicle.

The Appellate Division reversed. The appellate court first explained that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3 requires that automobile owners have auto insurance that covers loss arising out of the ownership, maintenance, operation and use of an automobile. The Court then explained that unloading and loading had always been a verified use of the vehicle under the statute, and implicit in this requirement is the obligation to provide omnibus liability coverage to all persons who use the named insured vehicle by participating in its loading or unloading.

The Appellate Division relied on the N.J. Supreme Court case of Penn Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Costa, where the Court found that to determine whether an injury arises out of the use of a motor vehicle thereby triggering coverage, that there must be a substantial nexus between the injury suffered and the asserted negligent use of the motor vehicle. Use of a motor vehicle has been interpreted broadly to include the acts of loading and unloading the automobile.

The Appellate Division found that in Bridgewater Donuts, LLC, the record supported a finding of the requisite substantial nexus. The Appellate Division pointed to the undisputed fact that plaintiffs’ drive-up window was available to customers to purchase and pick up their items and load the items into their car. Plaintiffs’ employee loading the hot tea she had purchased into her vehicle was integral to the completion of the transaction between Mendelsohn-Hall and plaintiffs. Therefore, the Court determined her injuries bore a substantial and not incidental nexus to Plaintiffs’ alleged negligent use during the loading process under her automobile policy.

Thus, the Court reversed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to defendant Geico and denying Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings.

Plaintiff Alejandra Padilla allegedly tripped, fell, and suffered injuries on the sidewalk that abutted the vacant commercial lot in Camden owned by the defendants Young Il An and Myo Soon An.  This property had been purchased more than 25 years previously but no building was ever constructed.  The issue in Padilla v. Il An, 2024 N.J. LEXIS 575 (June 13, 2024) before the Supreme Court was whether the owner of a vacant commercial lot had a common law duty to maintain the abutting public sidewalk in reasonably good condition.

On September 11, 2019, plaintiff allegedly was injured while walking on the public sidewalk abutting the vacant commercial lot located on Westfield Avenue in Camden, New Jersey that was owned by the defendants.  According to her deposition, plaintiff suffered several injuries from the fall, including a broken foot and injured arm, and underwent surgery for her injuries.  She claims to suffer continuing symptoms, including migraines, pain, and memory loss.

The lot abutting this public sidewalk had been owned by the defendants 27 years before plaintiff’s fall.  According to defendant Young Il An, they bought the lot intending to construct a building there but due to economic conditions, they gave up that plan.  They also did not purchase liability insurance to cover the lot because, according to the defendant, insurance companies did not really want to insure it.  After the fall, the defendants did have the sidewalk abutting the subject lot repaired. 

Plaintiff sued defendants based upon their alleged negligence in failing to reasonably maintain the sidewalk abutting the subject lot.  At the trial court level, the defendants were successful in obtaining a summary judgment dismissal.  The trial court held that the defendants did not owe a duty of care to plaintiff, relying on the Appellate Division’s decision in Abraham v. Gupta.  In the Abraham case, the Appellate Division held that “the liability imposed on commercial property owners to reasonably maintain abutting sidewalks does not apply to sidewalks abutting vacant lots.”  The trial court’s rationale was that the defendants did not have a duty to maintain the sidewalk because it abutted a vacant lot that was not generating any income.

This summary judgment dismissal in the Padilla case was appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the trial court’s judgment.  The Appellate Division ruled that Abraham remained good law as applied to the subject lot and declined to impose any duty upon the defendant vacant lot property owner to maintain the abutting sidewalk in a safe condition.

Plaintiff filed a petition for certification on the issue of whether owners of vacant commercial lots owe a duty of care to pedestrians to reasonably maintain the sidewalks abutting those lots.  The New Jersey Supreme Court granted the plaintiff’s petition, bringing this issue before the Supreme Court.

Plaintiff urged the Supreme Court to reverse the Appellate Division’s decision, contending that the Abraham case should be reversed.  Plaintiff contended that the Stewart v. 104 Wallace Street, Inc. case which imposed a duty of care upon commercial properties, as opposed to residential properties, to maintain the abutting public sidewalk, did not distinguish among types of commercial properties or consider whether those properties had active businesses on them.  Plaintiff further argued that imposing a duty of care would be fair because the subject lot was capable of generating income. 

The Supreme Court noted that in the four decades since the Stewart case, the New Jersey courts “have adhered to the rule imposing liability on commercial landowners.”  The issue in this case was whether that liability should be extended to commercial landowners of vacant lots.  The Court adopted a bright-line test, concluding that a duty should be imposed on owners of vacant commercial lots to maintain the abutting sidewalks in reasonably good condition.

The Court noted that there would be “something profoundly unfair about commercial property owners purchasing vacant lots and having no responsibility whatsoever from maintaining the area where the general public traverses.”   Hence, the Court ruled that all commercial landowners, including owners of vacant commercial lots “must maintain the public sidewalks abutting their property in reasonably good condition and can be held liable to pedestrians injured as a result of their negligent failure to do so.”

The Court explained that once “an individual or an entity purchases a lot in a commercially zoned area, meaning the only use to which that land can be put as commercial, the purchaser has begun a commercial endeavor and intends to make money.”  The Supreme Court rejected any type of profitability test to determine whether a duty should be imposed upon a commercial landowner, finding that profitability would be a difficult task to determine.  Thus, it found that a bright-line rule that commercial property owners owe a duty “is the most workable rule to protect the general public and ensure consistency in our courts.” 

Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, which had affirmed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to the defendant property owners and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings.

Plaintiff Mecca & Sons Trucking Corp. sued J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. over a shipment it claimed was damaged while in the possession of J.B. Hunt.  Because the seal on the food-grade shipment was broken, the customer had rejected the shipment.  The issue in Mecca & Sons Trucking Corp. v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 990 (App. Div. May 30, 2024) was whether Mecca’s employee of 40 years could offer an opinion on the standard of care for transporting a sealed container of a food-grade substance across the country.

Mecca had been hired by ADM Logistics to transport and deliver 20 sacks of Fibersol, which is a soluble dietary fiber used in foods, drinks, and supplements, in a sealed container from New Jersey to Illinois.  The sacks of Fibersol were made of polyurethane and tied at the top so the Fibersol would not fall out.  Further, the Fibersol was packed inside a shipping container sealed with an exterior lock.  The seal has a specific lock to stop unauthorized personnel from accessing the load and attached to the seal is a number that corresponds to a pickup number.  Mecca’s employee testified that “seals are common in the industry and are not to be broken under any circumstances by another other than the receiver at the time of delivery, and if the seal is broken, the load was tampered with.”

When the defendant J.B. Hunt took possession of the shipment it received, it received a bill of lading and acknowledged receipt of the shipment at the point of origin in good order.  The bill of lading referenced the seal number.   J.B. Hunt transported the sealed container via train from New Jersey to Landers, Illinois where it arrived still sealed.  An inspection of the container in Landers showed that the seal remained intact.  The container remained in J.B. Hunt’s possession for 4-5 days in its yard in Landers before another entity who was not a party, F&S Logistics, attempted to deliver the shipment to its final destination.

When the container arrived at its final destination, the customer, Parke Toll, rejected the delivery because the container seal was broken, although none of the 20 sacks of Fibersol were examined or determined to have been opened or compromised, nor were their contents tested for damage or adulteration.  Although the bill of lading did not contain express language that the seal must be intact upon delivery, according to the customer, it was its policy, as an entity that deals with food products to attempt to always maintain a good seal record and reject shipments that arrive with a broken seal.  Therefore, the truck was resealed and returned to defendant’s truck yard.  The entire shipment of Fibersol was deemed unusable and eventually destroyed. 

Plaintiff Mecca filed a claim with J.B. Hunt’s cargo claims office “for product integrity compromised” due to the broken seal on the shipment which had precipitated a complete loss of the Fibersol.  J.B. Hunt denied the claim. 

Mecca filed this lawsuit against J.B. Hunt, claiming breach of contract and negligence for the cargo loss and damage.  At the trial court level, J.B. Hunt filed for a summary judgment and the contract claim was dismissed but the negligence claim was not dismissed. 

The trial court found that the negligence claim was based upon J.B. Hunt’s failure to deliver the Fibersol with an intact seal.  Further, the trial court noted that the record contained evidence indicating that if the seal was broken upon delivery, that goes against the industry standard. 

To establish the industry standard, plaintiff Mecca presented the testimony of its employee Andre Zielinski with 40 years’ experience in the industry to establish the requisite standard of care.  He testified that the seal was a lock and you place a specific lock on a load from stopping an unauthorized personnel to enter into the load.  The seal is common in the industry and, if it is broken, that means the load was tampered with.  At that point, the receiver can choose to either accept the load or refuse the load because it is not intact.  His opinion was based upon his many years in the shipping industry in which he worked as a traffic manager or variations of that title.

On the eve of trial, the defendant made a motion in limine to bar Zielinski’s deposition testimony on the standard of care because he had not been named as an expert witness.  The court granted that motion, ruling that he could not provide an opinion on the standard of care because plaintiff had failed to name him as an expert.  However, the court ruled that Zielinski could testify as a fact witness based on his personal observations about the seal.

The matter proceeded to a bench trial and the court did find that the seal was intact when that Fibersol arrived in Landers.  It further found that, while the container was in the defendant’s yard for 4-5 days, the seal had been broken by a J.B. Hunt driver prior to the receipt of the delivery to the customer. 

However, the court found that the negligence claim was predicated on a standard of care owed by J.B. Hunt as a transport company, which standard was too complex to be determined without expert testimony.  The trial court judge found that plaintiff was required to establish the appropriate standard of care through an expert. Because the plaintiff had failed to establish the standard of care owed by J.B. Hunt, the Court dismissed the complaint.

This appeal ensued.  Plaintiff argued that the trial court made a mistake in prohibiting its longtime employee, with his many years of experience in the shipping industry, from opining on the standard of care.  Further, plaintiff argued that the trial court made a mistake by determining expert proof was required to establish damages.  The Appellate Division agreed with both of these arguments. 

Initially, the Court noted as follows: “A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence generally is entitled to deference absent a showing that the court abused its discretion such that the decision was so wide off the mark as to constitute a manifest in justice.”

Further, the Appellate Division stated that the courts “have required expert testimony to establish the standard of care in negligence actions or the underlying facts concern scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge that will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”  Under the lay opinion evidence rule, N.J.R.E. 701, “a party to an action with expertise gained through such personal experience may express an opinion of the sort ordinarily provided by an expert.”

The Appellate Division noted that Zielinski’s testimony was admitted by the court but that the trial court did not accept it to establish the appropriate standard of care.  The Court found that this decision was an error by the trial court.  Because Zielinski’s undisputed testimony that he had been in the shipping industry for about 40 years, had been an employee by a few companies, mostly major freight forwarding companies, where he worked as a traffic manager or the like, his testimony about the seal was based on facts known to him in his professional role as plaintiff’s employee.  Because of his extensive professional experience and personal knowledge about the facts of the case, the Appellate Division found that Zielinski was qualified to opine on the requisite standard of care on this negligence claim.  Further, the Court found that Zielinski was not required to be designated as an expert witness or to prepare a report to testify as to the standard of care.

Accordingly, the Appellate Division remanded the matter back to the trial court for reconsideration of the trial evidence consistent with its opinion.

Plaintiff Joseph Devaney was working as a security guard for G4S at facilities owned by defendant Chemours Company.  On the day of the accident, there was a winter storm with light snow, sleet, and freezing rain.  During the course of plaintiff’s inspection of the premises, he slipped and fell, suffering injuries.  The issue in Devaney v. Chemours Co. FC, LLC, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 776 (App. Div. May 2, 2024) was whether the ongoing storm doctrine decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court after the date of his fall applied to bar his claim.

As a security guard, plaintiff’s responsibilities including inspecting  incoming and outgoing cars at Chemours entrance and exit.  He would walk through the doorway to conduct his inspection.  Four days before his fall, there was a winter storm that resulted in less than 4 inches of snow.  On the day of the accident, January 8, 2018, there was a winter storm that began around 2:00 p.m. and did not end until around 9:30 p.m.  When Chemours became aware of the icy conditions, they contacted their snow contractor and alerted their security guards.

Plaintiff’s shift began around 6:00 p.m.  At around 8:30 p.m., while walking his usual path, he slipped and fell on the asphalt into the doorway between the areas he was inspecting.  He suffered injuries as a result of his fall.

At the trial court level, the defendant landowner Chemours filed a motion for summary judgment, relying upon the case of Pareja v. Princeton International, which was granted.   In Pareja, the Supreme Court adopted the ongoing storm rule which held that commercial landowners do not have a duty to remove the accumulation of snow and ice until the conclusion of the storm.  Based upon the adoption of this rule, it “relieved commercial landowners of the duty to continuously clear snow and ice from their property throughout the duration of an inclement winter weather event.”

Based upon those circumstances of this accident, it was undisputed that plaintiff’s slip and fall occurred during the snowstorm.  Accordingly, the Court found that the ongoing snowstorm rule applied and it relieved the defendant of any duty of care it may have owed plaintiff.

Plaintiff argued that the ongoing storm rule should not have been applied retroactively to accidents that occurred prior to the adoption of the rule.  Plaintiff argued that contradicted “the negligence jurisprudence that provides individuals recourse if they are seriously injured due to a defective sidewalk.”  The trial court judge rejected that argument. 

The Appellate Division found that the trial court correctly rejected the argument because there was nothing in Pareja which required prospective application only.  In fact, in Pareja, the Court applied the “newly rendered ongoing storm doctrine” to a 2015 slip and fall that had occurred during an ongoing storm.

The plaintiff also argued that the rule should not be extended to include sidewalks of “highly secured, restricted – access industrial facilities such as Chemours.”  The Appellate Division also rejected that argument, finding that Pareja rejected the distinction between public and private ownership, to ensure uniformity.  It declined to draw arbitrary lines for the type of property that fall under Pareja.  Hence, it found that there was no reason to limit Pareja’s application to exclude facilities such as Chemours.

Based upon Pareja, remediation was only required within a reasonable period of time after the storm had ended.  Thus, liability did not attach to the defendant landowner until after the storm ended, which in this case was about 9:00 p.m., well after the plaintiff fell.

Therefore, the Appellate Division was satisfied that the trial court correctly considered the entire record and found that the ongoing storm rule barred plaintiff’s negligence claim against defendant as a matter of law.  Therefore, the trial court decision was affirmed, which dismissed the lawsuit.

The decedent Alice Trainor fell while attending the defendant’s adult day health care services.  The 89-year-old Alice fell while walking towards the bathroom at the defendant’s facility, suffered injuries, and ultimately passed away.  The issue in Estate of Alice Trainor v. Active Day of Brick, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 552 (App. Div. Apr. 3, 2024) was whether the plaintiff was required to provide expert testimony as to the causation of Alice’s injuries to be able to pursue a claim for personal injuries.

The decedent, Alice Trainor, with vascular dementia, was attending adult day health care services at defendant’s Active Day of Brick’s facility.  She began walking towards the bathroom at the facility when another participant in the program attempted to help her.  However, defendant’s activities manager, Kellie Piaskowski, intervened and proceeded to assist Alice towards the bathroom.  She was attempting to guide her there.  Alice was shuffling her feet somewhat and tripped over her feet.  Alice fell flat down to the floor and banged her face.  She was taken by ambulance and treated for her injuries.  A few weeks later, she was found unresponsive, and her condition deteriorated.  She ultimately passed away within two months after the incident.

Her Estate filed a lawsuit against the facility, arguing that the defendant facility had a duty to provide Alice with a safe environment but failed to do so.  The defendant moved for a summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff’s claims failed because plaintiff did not have a medical expert to support plaintiff’s case.  The trial judge agreed with that argument, finding that plaintiffs had not provided an expert medical opinion asserting a causal relationship between the alleged negligence and the injuries Alice suffered. The judge granted the motion, dismissing the case and this appeal ensued.

Plaintiffs argued that there was a State mandated ratio of 9-1 (patient to staff ratio) and that Medicaid required a ratio of 5-1.  However, the defendant maintained a 30-1 ratio of patients to staff.  Plaintiffs argued that, because of the extreme imbalance between patients and caregivers, the finder of fact could rely on the theory of res ipsa loquitur to infer defendant’s lack of due care and, hence, negligence.  The trial judge had rejected this theory, stating that “under any stretch of the imagination,” this was not a res ipsa loquitor case.

Plaintiffs argued upon appeal that the medical causation was not in question and the jury does not need an expert to determine whether defendants’ 30-1 patient to staff ratio was a gross deviation from the standard of care.  The Appellate Division rejected that argument.

The Appellate Division noted that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, if applied, would allow a finder of fact “to infer with the defendant’s lack of due care only when three elements of the doctrine had been satisfied:

a)         The occurrence itself ordinarily speaks negligence;

b)         The instrumentality was within the defendant’s exclusive control; and

c)         There is no indication in the circumstances that the injury was the result of the plaintiff’s own voluntary act or neglect.

The Court noted that to satisfy this res ipsa loquitur standard, “plaintiffs would need to demonstrate that an 89-year-old falling while being assisted by a caregiver ‘itself ordinarily bespeaks negligence’; the environment was in ‘defendant’s exclusive control’; and ‘there was no indication in the circumstances that the injury was the result of [Alice]’s own voluntary act or neglect.’”  The Appellate Division found that the plaintiff was not able to satisfy any of these elements. 

Further, the Court explained that res ipsa loquitur only fills in a gap in plaintiff’s negligence claim with the respect to a breach of duty of care and not as to the causal relationship between a breach and the injury suffered.  The causal relationship is what the trial judge found was missing.  The Appellate Division noted that the jury would have no means of judging whether defendant’s purported short staffing or the staff member who helped Alice was the proximate cause of Alice’s injuries.

The appeals court agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that “a lay jury is insufficiently knowledgeable of the specifics of elder care and assistance to competently determine whether any purported short-staffing or Piaskowski’s helping Alice to the bathroom was the cause of Alice’s injuries.”  Thus, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial judge’s decision that, lacking expert testimony to that effect, the defendant must prevail as a matter of law. 

Plaintiff Artherine Price was at the Quaker Bridge Mall on May 10, 2018, when she twisted her ankle in the parking lot of the Mall.  She claims that she fell in the crosswalk while walking from her parked car to enter the store and sued the Mall defendants for her injuries.  The issue in Price v. Quaker Bridge Mall, LLC., 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 591 (App. Div. April 10, 2024) was whether the plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed due to her failure to identify the exact cause of her injury.

Plaintiff testified that her ankle twisted, and she almost fell as she was in the crosswalk.  She could not identify the exact location of where the incident occurred within the crosswalk.  She also testified that she never saw anything in the crosswalk, before or after the incident that caused her to twist her ankle.  Even after the incident, when she returned to the crosswalk with the security guard, she was unable to point to the specific spot where the incident occurred.  The best she could state was that the incident occurred in an area where the pavement was cracked.  Hence, she believed that the cracked or broken pavement caused her to twist her ankle.

The Mall defendants filed for a summary judgment dismissal based upon the plaintiff’s deposition testimony.  The trial court judge found that there was no dispute that plaintiff was injured in the Mall’s parking lot.  However, the issue was that plaintiff could not establish causation.  Even when she went to the location a few days later and took photographs, she was unable to identify any particular cause.  Because the mere happening of an accident was insufficient to establish negligence, the trial court judge granted defendants’ summary judgment motion.

The plaintiff appealed that decision to the Appellate Division.

Upon appeal, Plaintiff acknowledged that her deposition testimony had inconsistencies regarding causation and that a jury could conclude at trial that such inconsistencies adversely affected her credibility.  Plaintiff argued that they did not provide a basis for the trial court judge to disregard her testimony and grant defendant’s summary judgment.

The Appellate Division noted that proximate causation is a basic element of tort law.  The court stated that “[to] establish causation a plaintiff must prove the defendant’s act or omission was both the factual and proximate cause of his or her injury.”  It would be the factual cause if, but for the event, the injury probably would not have happened.

Here, the Appellate Division was convinced that defendants were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  The Court noted “that [t]he judge’s factual findings were supported by substantial evidence in the record and reveal there is no dispute of fact regarding causation.”  The Court further pointed out that plaintiff was unable to establish that “but for” defendants’ actions or omission she would not have twisted her ankle because she cannot establish what condition caused her to twist her ankle. 

Accordingly, the Appellate Division found that she failed to make a showing sufficient to establish causation, which is an essential element of her case.  Therefore, the Court agreed that defendants were entitled to summary judgment and affirmed the trial court decision, dismissing her lawsuit. 

Plaintiff Reginald Jones was injured when he was attempting to cross in the middle of Isabella Avenue in Irvington.  While stepping off the curb, his foot became stuck in a hole in the street adjacent to the curb.  It caused him to fall and suffer injuries.  The issue in Jones v. Township of Irvington, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 176 (App. Div. Feb. 6, 2024) was whether he could pursue a claim against the Township for its failure to remediate the pothole. 

Personal injury claims against public entities are governed by the Tort Claims Act.  To be able to sue a public entity for tort liability for injuries caused by that entity’s property, under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2, the plaintiff must establish the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury and that the condition was either created by an employee of the public entity or the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the condition. However, even if the plaintiff is able to present those proofs, the public entity would not be liable for the dangerous condition of its property “if the action the entity took to protect against the condition or the failure to take such action was not palpably unreasonable.”

There were two issues in this case.  First, the issue was whether the plaintiff had sufficiently established that there was a dangerous condition of the Township’s property at the time of his accident.  Second, the issue was whether the Township had notice that the property was in a hazardous condition.

While the parties conducted discovery, there were no depositions taken and there were no experts retained.  The only evidence of the pothole were 11 photographs of the roadway produced by the plaintiff.  The photographs showed a hole which was surrounded by vegetation growth, cracked, and filled with garbage and vegetation.  According to the plaintiff, the hole measured about 19 inches long, 19 inches wide, and 16 inches deep.

Once discovery concluded, the Township filed for a summary judgment.  It argued that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by a dangerous condition of its property.  Plaintiff opposed that motion, arguing that the Township had constructive notice of the ‘“large sinkhole.’”

The trial court judge granted the motion for summary judgment.  The judge ruled that plaintiff had failed to present any competent evidence other than speculation and legal conclusion to prove that the hole was in a dangerous condition.  The trial court judge noted that the only evidence in support of the condition of the property were the photographs attached to plaintiff’s answers to interrogatories which were not glossy color photos, nor were they provided with any certification stating who took the photos and when they were taken. Further, the plaintiff failed to prove that the Township had notice of the condition.

Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied, again on the same basis due to the plaintiff’s failure to prove the Township had prior notice of the condition or had adequate proofs as to its actual condition.  The plaintiff appealed this decision to the Appellate Division.

The Appellate Division found that the trial court correctly ruled that plaintiff had failed to establish liability under the Tort Claims Act due to lack of evidence that the Township either caused the hole in the street or had actual or constructive notice of the hole. In support of the notice argument, plaintiff cited to a Township Public Works website that street sweepers were on Isabella Avenue twice a week.  However, the Court found this information insufficient to show that the Township had constructive notice of the hole. 

The Court also found that plaintiff had failed to offer any expert testimony or proofs showing that there were any reports about the hole which could have established that the Township had actual notice thereof.  Last, the Appellate Division found that the plaintiff had failed to submit any proofs that the Township acted in a “palpably unreasonable manner.”  The Appellate Division agreed with the trial court that the plaintiff’s claim was based on nothing more than ‘“mere speculation.’”

The appeals court also agreed with the trial court that the photographs themselves were insufficient competent evidence due to the lack of foundation as to these photographs.  The plaintiff had failed to offer any competent testimony “concerning the measurements of the hole, who took the photographs, when they were taken, and if they were altered.” 

Hence, the Appellate Division agreed that plaintiff failed to meet his burden under the Tort Claims Act to “establish that the Township had or could have had actual or constructive notice of the hole in the middle of Isabella Avenue.”  Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial court decision, dismissing the lawsuit. 

This case involved an emotional distress claim filed by plaintiff Richard Sperazza in waking up to find the body of his murdered friend and co-worker in the hotel room they were sharing during a work assignment.  Plaintiff and his deceased friend and co-worker were sharing a hotel room during an out of town work assignment.  The issue in Strayer v. Wingate at Wyndham, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 90 (App. Div. Jan. 19, 2024) was whether the plaintiff had a claim for a negligent infliction of emotional distress against the defendant Wingate at Wyndham for the emotional harm he suffered on waking up to find the body of his murdered friend and co-worker in their hotel room.

Plaintiff Sperazza had been employed by Osmose Utilities Services, Inc. as a technician who worked with his friend and roommate, Ivan Scott Strayer.  Plaintiff, Strayer, and other utility workers were assigned to work crews which travelled to various locations around the country and lived together in hotels while on assignment.  Plaintiff and Strayer had been hotel roommates on other work assignments and also socialized frequently outside of work.  Plaintiff was the best man at Strayer’s wedding and plaintiff considered Strayer family and attended his family functions.

Plaintiff and other members of the Osmose work crew had been staying at the Wingate Hotel in Vineland.  The crew consisted of five crew members including plaintiff, Strayer and two brothers, Charles Pulcine and his brother Larry Pulcine, and the crew leader, Mark Knowles.  Larry Pulcine had recently joined the crew.  Knowles made the hotel reservations and advised the front desk clerk who was staying in which room.  The crew members were assigned to three rooms in which plaintiff and Strayer were assigned to Room 404, the Pulcine brothers were assigned to Room 405 and Knowles was assigned to Room 406.

On the evening of the murder, plaintiff ate at a restaurant located in front of the hotel.  Strayer eventually met him at the restaurant but returned to the hotel room.  When plaintiff returned later to their hotel room around 10:00, he observed the television was on and Strayer appeared to be sleeping.  Thereafter, he received a text message from Chuck Pulcine, inviting him to hang out and drink some beers in his room.  At about 10:05 p.m., plaintiff went to Pulcine’s room, although he briefly returned to his room to grab a few beers while Strayer stayed in their hotel room.  He then returned to the Pulcines’ room where he stayed until about 11:30 p.m.

While plaintiff was in the Pulcines’ room, Larry had left for about 30 minutes, stating he was going to do laundry and when he returned, Larry was “shooting his mouth off.” Therefore, plaintiff returned to his hotel room and went to sleep.

When plaintiff woke up around 5:00 to 5:15 a.m. and Strayer was still in bed, plaintiff went over to look at him.  He noticed that “his eyes were open” but “nothing really going on.”  He grabbed his foot which was ice cold, checked his pulse twice and panicked and ran out of the room.  He felt shock at finding his friend’s body and feared for his own safety.  He later learned that Strayer had been shot with a handgun.  However, plaintiff did not witness the murder and did not encounter the murderer in his hotel room and, further, was not physically harmed himself.

It was later learned that Larry had obtained a key card from the front desk to the plaintiff’s room and shot Strayer sometime between 10:30 and 11:30 p.m. while plaintiff was across the hall in the Pulcines’ hotel room. 

Strayer’s wife brought a wrongful death and survivorship action against the defendant hotel, among other defendants.  Plaintiff brought a separate action for negligent infliction of emotional distress for discovering the body of his murdered friend.

Plaintiff obtained a hotel management operations expert who opined that the Wingate Hotel “was aware of its safety obligations and deviated from the industry standard of care that created a foreseeable risk of harm to the hotel’s guests.”  Further, the expert opined that “Larry’s criminal acts were the type of criminal activity that adequate safety and security measures are intended to prevent and were, therefore foreseeable.”  According to the expert, the failure to identify or properly register the Osmose crew was inconsistent with proper keycard control “and resulted in a foreseeable risk of harm to guests.”  The expert opined “that the implementation and enforcement of a proper keycard controlled protocol system could have prevented Larry’s unauthorized entry into plaintiff’s and Strayer’s room.”

At the trial court level, the defendants moved for a summary judgment, which was granted.  The trial court judge found that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that defendant hotel’s actions proximately caused plaintiff’s emotional injuries.  He found that the injuries were not based upon the handing of a keycard and that neither defendants nor their employees caused any of the emotional distress being suffered by plaintiff.  While acknowledging that defendant’s employee should not have given the keycard to Larry Pulcine, he noted that the crew members were all friends and he had seen them together and it was not as if he was giving a keycard to a stranger.

This appeal ensued.  Plaintiff argued that the trial court made a mistake in granting defendant’s summary judgment because he has a direct claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress based upon defendants’ breach of duty it owed directly to him.  Plaintiff relied on the case of Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559 (1965) in support of his claim for emotional distress.  The Appellate Division rejected this argument.

For a plaintiff to recover for emotional distress for witnessing harm suffered by others, the individual must be able to allege that they were “fearful of immediate injury.”  The Appellate Division found that, under these facts, the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a reasonable fear of immediate personal injury.  While he may have felt fear when he discovered his roommate’s dead body, there was no evidence in the record that he had a “reasonable fear of immediate personal injury.”  To the contrary, plaintiff did not even realize at the time that Strayer had been murdered and he thought that Strayer had died from natural causes.  He did not encounter the murderer in his hotel room and was not present when Strayer was murdered.  Because of his failure to present any evidence that he suffered a reasonable fear of personal injury, the Appellate Division found that the plaintiff was unable to establish a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.  Hence, it upheld the trial court decision, granting summary judgment and dismissing the case.

Plaintiff Richard Finaldi (“Finaldi”) was in an automobile accident with defendant Matthew Knight (“Knight”), one of defendant Cornucopia Logistics, LLC’s (“Cornucopia”) dispatchers.  Knight had stolen a Cornucopia delivery van, fell asleep while operating the van, went through a red light and collided with plaintiff Finaldi.  Plaintiff Finaldi suffered serious injuries as a result of the accident.  An issue in Finaldi v. Knight, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 7 (App. Div. Jan. 3, 2024) was whether the defendant Cornucopia could be held responsible for its employee’s actions in causing this accident. 

Cornucopia had an agreement with Amazon to deliver groceries ordered through Amazon Fresh.  Pursuant to its agreement, Cornucopia had exclusive responsibility for its employees and employment conditions.  It used leased delivery vans to make the deliveries, which it stored at the Amazon Fulfillment Center in Avenel, where Cornucopia also had an office.

Back at the time of the accident, Cornucopia had several employees at this facility including managers, four dispatchers and about thirty drivers, each for the morning and the night shifts.  Each shift had one dispatcher.  The dispatcher would log in and assign the drivers their routes.  When a driver clocked in, the dispatcher would give them a handbag containing a key to a van, an EZ pass, vehicle registration and insurance and a scanner which permitted the drivers to scan each package in and out.  The scanner also acted as a GPS and had a camera.  It allowed supervisors to see where each driver had dropped off their last package.

When the vans were not in use, Cornucopia kept the keys in a cabinet behind the dispatch table.  It was supposed to be locked after the dispatcher checked in the drivers and gave them their handbags.  Each dispatcher had a key to the cabinet, as well as two of the managers.  The standard operating procedure was for the dispatcher to log in each key and take inventory of those keys.  The dispatcher would count the keys after the drivers returned.  If one of the dispatchers discovered a key was missing, they would see if the vehicle was in the parking lot and, if not, notify one of the managers.

Knight, initially worked for Cornucopia as a driver but, after his license was suspended, he became a dispatcher.  This position did not require driving so he could continue to work at Cornucopia.

The day before the accident, Knight had stolen the van to assist his mother in moving.  His plan had been to return the van to the facility in time for the next shift.  He entered the facility, found the cabinet with the keys to the van unlocked and took one of them.  Only after the accident did Knight inform the Cornucopia fleet coordinator that he had taken the van.  No one at Cornucopia knew the van was missing until after the accident.  According to the testimony, this was the first time that an employee had used a van for personal use. 

Plaintiff sued for Cornucopia for both negligent hiring and retention, as well as general negligence.

At the trial court level, Cornucopia moved for a summary judgment which was granted as to both claims.  The court found that Cornucopia owed no duty to plaintiffs because Cornucopia had no reason to know “that there was an enhanced risk of harm to a third-party by hiring Knight to work as a dispatcher.”  The court also found that there was no history of Cornucopia employees stealing vehicles and that it had adequate security measures in place.

Further, the trial court ruled that plaintiffs failed to establish that Cornucopia’s actions were the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.  The court reasoned that Knight was not working at the time of the accident, he was not using the vehicle with Cornucopia’s permission, and Cornucopia took reasonable precautions to prevent against such actions.

A motion for reconsideration was also denied.  This appeal ensued.  Upon appeal, the Appellate Division noted that the threshold question was whether Cornucopia owed a duty to plaintiffs.  The Court held that for a Court to impose a duty, “there must be a foreseeable risk of harm.”  Plaintiffs argued in the appeal that Cornucopia’s employees did not follow its procedures to prevent and detect the theft of the van.

The Appellate Division rejected that argument.  It found that Cornucopia’s policy in keeping the keys in a locked cabinet, having the dispatcher on duty take inventory of them twice every shift, and that the Avenel facility not being in a high crime area did not result in an imposition of a duty upon Cornucopia. 

Further, the Appellate Division noted that Cornucopia had no reason to suspect an employee would take a van for their own personal use.  Its policies prohibited an employee from taking the delivery vans for their own use and an employee could be terminated for violating that policy. 

Hence, the appeals court declined to follow plaintiff’s argument that the unauthorized use of the van and the accident were sufficiently foreseeable to impose a duty upon Cornucopia.  Moreover, the Court noted that even if it was foreseeable that an employee would steal one of the vans, it could not have known that Knight, who had no prior accidents as a driver for the company, would doze off at the wheel and collide with the plaintiff.  

Additionally, the Appellate Division rejected plaintiff’s argument that Cornucopia was negligent in promoting Knight to a dispatcher position after his license was suspended.  A license suspension alone did not suggest an employee would be deceitful or prone to theft.  It would not have put Cornucopia on notice that he would use its vehicle in violation of company policy.  Accordingly, the Appellate Division upheld the trial court’s decision, dismissing the case as to Cornucopia.

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