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School Law Blog

Lead by Sanmathi (Sanu) Dev, Esq., this blog is devoted to current developments in New Jersey education law affecting school districts, charter schools, students, and employees.

As a practitioner who has spent most of his legal career as a school board attorney serving as general or labor counsel to boards of education, I address a trend that seems to be on the rise – litigation brought for employment discrimination in the wake of a non-tenured teacher being non-renewed at the conclusion of the teacher’s annual employment contract.

In the world of school law, a “non-renewal” is distinct from a “termination,” “discharge,” or “firing” in both the legal and practical sense.  The latter tend to occur upon notice, and, in the public school context, almost always with cause.  A “non-renewal,” however, can be with or without cause.  All non-tenured teachers are entitled to written notice by May 15 each year about whether they will be renewed or not for the next succeeding school year.  N.J.S.A. 18A:27-10.  If a teacher is non-renewed, he or she has a right to request a written statement of reasons and appear before the Board of Education for an informal hearing known as a Donaldson hearing, the purpose of which is to attempt to convince the Board to offer reemployment notwithstanding the Superintendent’s failure to recommend renewal.  The case law of the Commissioner of Education has, for decades, made it absolutely clear that a non-tenured teacher can be non-renewed for any reason or no reason at all, so long as it is not a reason that would be “arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable,” such as, for example, discrimination or unlawful retaliation.

Indeed, the ability of the school district to sever ties with a teacher through this quick and relatively painless process is precisely what delineates the difference in legal rights between a tenured teacher and a non-tenured teacher.  Once a teacher fulfills the statutory requirements and obtains tenure, the process for removal becomes significantly more difficult.  Tenured teachers are legally entitled to new contracts each year, and they can only be removed upon the filing of tenure charges and a statement of evidence with the Board of Education, which are then referred for Board approval, followed by a “sufficiency determination” on the charges from the Commissioner.  Only if the charges are deemed sufficient to warrant removal is the matter then referred for an expedited arbitration hearing by one of 50 arbitrators who are maintained on a panel by the Commissioner for hearing such tenure cases.  Grounds for appeal are extremely limited.  As a result, tenure charges tend to be filed in only the most serious cases of employee misconduct or inability, or in cases of documented inefficiency.

This distinction between tenured employees and non-tenured employees has led to an interesting, and somewhat paradoxical, phenomenon when it comes to the types of employment litigation brought against local school districts, in general, and in terms of which employees are likely to bring it, in particular.  To put it bluntly, a school district is far more likely to be sued in court under a statutory cause of action with fee-shifting by a non-tenured teacher who was non-renewed than by a tenured teacher who was subject to tenure charges.

By way of example, recently, I successfully defended a case against a charter school brought under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”).  The plaintiff was a teacher/learning specialist who was employed for just over a semester and a few months before she was granted an extended medical leave of absence, followed by a maternity leave, under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).  The employee had significant performance and disciplinary issues since beginning her employment the previous January and working the second semester of her first school year.  Just two months into the new school year, she unexpectedly went out on disability leave in October due to a high-risk pregnancy.  The following May, the employee was non-renewed by reason of her performance issues.  She never requested a statement of reasons or a Donaldson hearing.

The employee brought disparate treatment theory claims under the NJLAD, alleging that her non-renewal was based on gender, pregnancy, and disability discrimination.  Her performance evaluations had been mediocre at best.  Within the first two months of her employment, the charter school had found her classroom management skills to be so poor that it assigned her a teacher-mentor to coach her and “reset” her classroom culture, which had become toxic.  The teacher had initially shown some promise, but soon, these performance issues caused her supervisors to reconsider promoting her.  She had been absent from her classroom without explanation.  Her fellow teachers indicated she was warehousing difficult students in the back of their rooms with “time-outs” nearly every day.

After almost 2 years of discovery painstakingly documenting the performance deficiencies, the case was ultimately dismissed and summary judgment was granted in favor of the charter school, with the trial judge finding (1) that the Plaintiff failed to set forth sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude she had satisfied the prima facie elements of discriminatory intent, or that she was performing the functions of her position at a level that met the school’s legitimate expectations; and (2) that the charter school had numerous legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for non-renewing her employment, including below proficient evaluation scores, improper use of “time-outs,” and poor classroom management skills.

If it were a tenured teacher, such a case could never have occurred.  The tenure arbitration process would have decided threshold legal issues, such as whether the employee was performing her functions in a manner that met with the school’s legitimate expectations, or whether there were adequate non-discriminatory reasons to terminate the employee in the very first instance.  Knowing this, the school district would have taken great pains to ensure significant documentation of the employee’s misconduct or inefficiency long before undertaking to bring tenure charges.  In this case, the evidence was there in the minds of the teacher’s colleagues and supervisors, but it was not documented.  The oversight was a simple one, oft-repeated in the world of public education.  Sometimes, the feeling that a school district can non-renew any non-tenured teacher painlessly and without consequences is so well-known it can lead to a false sense of security.  Things that would have been documented in uncomfortable meetings, letters of reprimand, or “evaluative memoranda” in the personnel file fail to be documented.

The takeaway for public school employers:  Any time you are considering non-renewing a non-tenured employee who is a member of a protected class, or who has complained of the employer’s practices or policies, recognize that the district is potentially vulnerable to litigation under the NJLAD, the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”), or other statutory remedies, and document, document, document. . . .  If the employee has done something serious enough to warrant termination, discuss the situation with legal counsel and consider terminating rather than non-renewing them, even though it risks a labor arbitration over whether the termination was “for just cause.”  Better to have an arbitrator cheaply decide a termination case than to find the school district enmeshed for years in sticky employment litigation in Superior Court with a hungry Plaintiff’s attorney trying to leverage fee-shifting to the tune of hundreds of thousands.  Sometimes, the “easy way out” isn’t always….

 


For over ten years, Cameron R. Morgan has served the public school districts of the State of New Jersey in the specialized area of school law, representing boards of education in all aspects of their legal needs, with a focus on general counsel services, civil litigation, special education, administrative law, collective negotiations, labor and employment, and appellate practice.  He has served as Board Solicitor to dozens of school districts, guiding district administrators through the diverse range of issues affecting the public schools, from personnel matters, tenure cases, and the range of issues that frequently arise at public board meetings, to student disciplinary matters, residency disputes, and homelessness issues, to complex matters involving the budgetary process or First Amendment rights.

Lauren E. Tedesco, Esq., a shareholder in the firm’s School Law Group, was recently interviewed by Special Ed Connection on the topic of banning parents from school campuses.

To view the PDF version of the article, please click here.

Plaintiff John Paff filed a lawsuit in the Law Division of the New Jersey Superior Court against the Trenton Board of Education (“Board”) alleging, in part, that the Board violated the Open Public Meetings Act (“OPMA”) and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”) because the Board did not reference the payment of a merit bonus to the Superintendent on its agenda for a public meeting. Plaintiff argued that if he prevailed on this issue, he would be entitled to attorney’s fees under OPMA. While the Superior Court found that the Board violated OPMA by failing to provide the public with adequate notice pursuant to N.J.S.A. 10:4-8(d), it denied Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees. Plaintiff appealed to the New Jersey Appellate Division.

On November 13, 2020, the Appellate Division in Paff v. Trenton Board of Education confirmed that attorney’s fees are not an available remedy under OPMA or NJCRA. The plain reading of OPMA demonstrates that OPMA provides limited monetary penalties for persons who knowingly violate this law, but it does not provide for attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing party. Similarly, the NJCRA does not supplement remedies under OPMA. As such, even though Plaintiff was successful in obtaining a ruling that the Board violated OPMA, he was not entitled to attorney’s fees.

Note that OPMA is different than the Open Public Records Act, which does expressly provide for attorney’s fees if a party prevails in Superior Court against a public entity.

On November 30, 2020, Governor Philip Murphy signed Executive Order 204, which imposes additional restrictions on how New Jersey school districts conduct sports during the COVID-19 pandemic. As it applies to school districts, Executive Order 204:

  1. Prohibits indoor sports (including practices and games); and
  2. Limits outdoor sports to 25 people. However, players, coaches, and referees necessary for the practice/game are not counted toward the total 25.

These restrictions begin on December 5, 2020 and end on January 2, 2021, unless otherwise revoked or modified by the Governor. The Governor may decide to continue the restrictions or modify them based on the number of COVID-19 cases during the holiday season.

On November 16, 2020, Governor Philip Murphy signed Executive Order 196 related to the COVID-19 pandemic.  A significant aspect of the Order is that legislative proceedings of school boards are expressly excluded from the capacity limits on gatherings in EO196 or any other applicable Executive Order.  Previously, it was unclear whether the legislative proceedings exemption to the capacity requirements applied to boards of education.  The Order clarifies that the exemption does apply.  Caution is urged because other requirements related to social distancing and mask wearing continue to apply and will have the effect of limiting capacity at board meetings.  The Order also addresses a number of issues relevant to gatherings including athletic practices and competitions.

On October 30, 2020, the New Jersey Appellate Division in Schwartz v. Princeton Board of Education issued an unpublished decision affirming that a board of education may utilize an electronic voting system so long as all of the other requirements of the Open Public Meetings Act (“OPMA”) are met. In other words, electronic voting by board of education members is not a per se violation of OPMA.

Plaintiffs, members of the public, filed a lawsuit against the Princeton Board of Education (“Board”) alleging that its vote on a specific agenda item at its June 12, 2018 public meeting violated OPMA. The agenda item involved whether to approve a send-receive agreement with a neighboring school district. Plaintiffs primarily argued that the Board’s electronic system of voting was a “secret ballot” and that they did not fully witness the Board’s decision making process.

The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s determination that OPMA was not violated. Plaintiffs and thirty other members of the public physically attended the June 12, 2018 Board meeting. The Board also live-streamed the meeting on YouTube for additional public access. The Board used a cloud-based electronic system called BoardDocs to take Board members’ votes on agenda items from their laptops. Once the vote on an agenda item was closed, the votes were saved and then projected on a screen for public viewing.

In their lawsuit, Plaintiffs claimed that that they were unable to hear or see the votes. However, Plaintiffs nor any member of the public complained at the June 12, 2018 meeting or thereafter that they were unable to see the results on the screen or asked that the results be read aloud. While the trial court acknowledged that the display screen was “difficult to read” and that it would have been “better for the public to know how each member voted at the time,” these issues did not rise to the level of an OPMA violation.

The Appellate Division agreed with the trial court that OPMA allows for flexibility in the manner in which public bodies conduct their meetings. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ arguments, OPMA does not require sequential or roll call voting for this kind of item. The Board’s meeting minutes also made clear how each Board member voted. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Appellate Division affirmed that there was no secrecy in the Board’s voting process.

The Board, in this case, maintained the public’s right under N.J.S.A. 10:4-7 to be present at all public meetings and witness in full detail all phases of the deliberation, policy formulation, and decision making of the Board.

On September 24, 2020, the Department of Community Affairs, Division of Local Government Services (“DLGS”) issued Local Finance Notice 2020-21 to further explain the new emergency regulations for remote public meetings held during a declared emergency.  The emergency regulations were promulgated by the Director of DLGS in accordance with Section 8 of newly enacted L. 2020, c. 34, and are codified as N.J.A.C. 5:39-1.1. through 1.7.  The emergency regulations aim to ensure continuity of government operations and transparency in conducting public business when an emergency requires a governing body, subject to the Open Public Meetings Act, to hold meetings remotely.  Boards of education are included in these emergency regulations and are subject to their requirements.

The emergency regulations are presently in effect and have been concurrently proposed for permanent adoption in the October 19, 2020 New Jersey Register.  Public comments may be submitted on the regulations until November 18, 2020.

The new regulations impose various new obligations on governing bodies that hold fully remote and/or hybrid (in-person and remote) meetings during a declared emergency.  These obligations include but are not limited to:

  • No cost public access;
  • Platform selected to facilitate the remote meeting must have the capacity for the normal public turnout at similar meetings.  That capacity must accommodate at least 50 individuals in addition to officials participating in the meeting;
  • Platform utilized can be audio-only, audio plus video, or livestream;
  • Telephone conference line for allowing members of the public with limited or no internet access to listen and provide public comment;
  • Public comment submission in writing in advance of the meeting within a reasonable amount of time before the meeting;
  • Any presentations or documents that could be viewed or made available to members of the public during an in-person meeting must be made visible on a video broadcast of the remote public meeting or made available on the website of the local public body; and
  • Local public body holding the meeting must adopt, by resolution, standard procedures, and requirements for public comments.

In addition to the above, the regulations also account for proper notice of a remote public meeting and guidance on how local public bodies should revise their annual notices to incorporate remote public meetings.

As the new requirements differ greatly from those issued from DLGS in March 2020, it is imperative that boards of education review their current practices for conducting fully remote and/or hybrid (in-person and remote) meetings during the declared COVID-19 emergency.

Passage of Chapter 79 places new restrictions on a school district’s ability to subcontract work performed by its existing employees.  Chapter 79, which was approved on September 11, 2020 and became effective immediately, prohibits a school district from entering into a subcontracting agreement affecting the employment of any employees in a collective bargaining unit during the term of an existing collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). A district may enter into a subcontracting agreement for a period following the term of the current CBA if the district:

  1. provides written notice to the majority representative of employees in each collective bargaining unit which may be affected by the subcontracting agreement and to the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission (“Commission”) no less than 90 days before the district requests bids or solicits contractual proposals for the subcontracting agreement; and

  2. offers the majority representative of the employees in each collective bargaining unit which may be affected by the subcontracting agreement the opportunity (i) to meet and consult with the district to discuss the decision to subcontract, and (ii) to engage in negotiations over the impact of the subcontracting.

The decision to subcontract is not mandatorily negotiable.  The school district’s obligation to negotiate will not preclude its right to subcontract should no successor agreement exist.  However, all aspects or actions relating to or resulting from a district’s decision to subcontract including, but not limited to, whether or not severance pay is provided, are expressly made mandatory subjects of bargaining by Chapter 79. 

Displaced employees are given certain rights by Chapter 79.  These include retention of previously acquired seniority and recall rights whenever the subcontracting terminates.

A district that violates any provision of Chapter 79 is deemed to have committed an unfair practice which can have significant financial consequences.  Any affected employee or majority representative may bring an unfair practice charge with the Commission.  If the charging party prevails, the employee is entitled to a remedy including, but not limited to, reinstatement, back pay, back benefits, back emoluments, tenure and seniority credit, attorney’s fees, and any other relief the Commission deems appropriate.

In a precedential opinion sure to make waves in the special education community, on September 17, 2020, in D.S. v. Trumbull Board of Education, 120 L.R.P. 133 (2d Cir. 2020), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that functional behavioral assessments (“FBAs”) of special education students conducted by a public school district are not “evaluations” capable of triggering a parent’s right to request an independent educational evaluation (“IEE”) from the district by an outside evaluator, at public expense.  The case puts front and center an issue of first impression that has rarely been addressed in the district courts of the Third Circuit, and never in this context.  While the decision is binding in New York, Connecticut, and Vermont, it will surely shake things up in our neighboring Third Circuit jurisdictions of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware, where each year public school districts spend tens of thousands of dollars performing independent FBAs at parental request, by outside private evaluators, rather than choosing to spend even more defending FBAs conducted by the school district itself. 

Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), school districts are required to perform a comprehensive initial evaluation of the child in all areas of suspected disability prior to rendering an initial eligibility determination for special education and related services and developing an individualized education program (“IEP”) for the child.  If the child is eligible, the district is also required to conduct comprehensive “triennial” reevaluations every three years.  Pursuant to federal regulations, a parent is entitled to an IEE at public expense “if the parent disagrees with an evaluation obtained by the public agency,” unless the school district requests a due process hearing “to show that its evaluation is appropriate.”  34 C.F.R. 300.502(b).  In New Jersey, if a parent makes a written request for an IEE “[u]pon completion of an initial evaluation or reevaluation” provided by the school district, the district must provide the IEE at no cost to the parent, unless it files for due process within 20 calendar days to show the appropriateness of its own evaluation with which the parent disagrees.  N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.5(c).  Parents are entitled to only one IEE each time the school district performs an evaluation with which they disagree, although the request for an IEE can include requests for multiple different types of assessments, so long as only one such request is made in response to the district evaluation or reevaluation.

In Trumbull, the student, D.S., underwent a comprehensive reevaluation in October 2014, making him due for his next triennial reevaluation in October 2017.  Yet, in the spring of each school year, the district and parent voluntarily agreed to conduct an FBA, in order to help them better understand the motivations underlying D.S.’s problem behaviors and assist them in fine-tuning his IEP to reduce or extinguish those behavior in order to ensure they did not interfere with his learning.  In response to the district’s March 2017 FBA, D.S.’s parents requested an IEE, seeking not only a private FBA, but also many other types of private assessments, at public expense, and they sought to withdraw their consent to his October 2017 triennial reevaluation.  The district refused and filed for due process in response to the IEE request. 

The procedural history of the case was nearly as fascinating as the Second Circuit’s substantive holding.  At the initial due process hearing, the hearing officer accepted that an FBA was a type of evaluation that could trigger the right to an IEE at public expense, and the school district did not dispute that position.  Yet, the hearing officer rejected the parents’ IEE request, finding that they could not make an IEE request for comprehensive reevaluations in other areas that exceeded the scope of the FBA conducted by the district.  On appeal, the federal district court found that the school district had waived any argument that an FBA was not an evaluation for purposes of an IEE request, and affirmed the hearing officer’s finding that the parents could not request an IEE at public expense that exceeded the scope of the district’s evaluation.  The district court also found that the IDEA’s two-year statute of limitations on due process complaints barred the parents from basing their request for an IEE upon an alleged disagreement with the October 2014 comprehensive reevaluation. 

On further appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court and held that the parents did not have a right to an independent FBA at public expense because an FBA is not an “evaluation” within the meaning of the IDEA for purposes of an IEE request, choosing to take up the issue sua sponte, even though that issue was not addressed at any prior point in the litigation.  The circuit court held:

“D.S.’s parents argue, the hearing officer found without objection, the district court assumed, and the Board concedes that an FBA constitutes an ‘evaluation’ with which a parent may disagree to obtain an IEE at public expense. As a result, the hearing officer and district court both concluded that, with respect to a limited assessment like an FBA, a parent’s right to disagree may not exceed the scope of the contested evaluation. This contention/finding/assumption/concession accepts a false equivalency that if not righted produces a remedy at odds with the purpose and intent of the Act.”

The Second Circuit then explained its reasoning that the IDEA’s plain text sets forth two types of evaluations:  initial evaluations and reevaluations.  “That the statute does not expressly or impliedly mention a third category of evaluations comprised of limited or targeted assessments,” the court reasoned, “suggests that there is none.”  Citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2), the court carefully laid out the four critical characteristics that the federal regulations utilize to define an assessment as either an “initial evaluation” or a “reevaluation,” including (1) the use of a variety of assessment tools and strategies, (2) not using any  single measure or assessment as the sole criterion, (3) using technically sound instruments to assess the relative contribution of cognitive and behavioral factors, in addition to physical or developmental factors, and (4) “assessing the child in all areas of suspected disability.”  The court made clear that, unless an evaluation by the school district meets these requirements as an “initial evaluation” or a “reevaluation” (meaning a triennial), it is merely a “limited or targeted assessment” that does not trigger a parent’s right to request an IEE at public expense.  The court plainly stated that, “[a]n FBA, standing alone, is neither,” though its reasoning could just as easily be applied to many other types of assessments of a special education child performed outside the context of a full initial evaluation or triennial reevaluation.

In so holding, the Second Circuit rejected the two policy letters from the U.S. Department of Education that school districts and parents have long relied upon for guidance in this area.  See Letter to Christiansen (Feb. 9, 2007) (opining that an FBA conducted to develop a behavioral intervention plan for a child would trigger a parent’s right to request an IEE at public expense); see also Letter to Scheinz (June 7, 2000) (opining that a parent could obtain an IEE at public expense in response to an FBA conducted outside the context of an initial eval or triennial reeval).  Flatly dismissing the existing policy guidance from U.S. DOE, the court held:  “The Department of Education’s interpretation ignores the plain text of the statute and regulations, and therefore we owe it no deference.”             

In the wake of this decision, observers and practitioners of special education law will surely have interesting days ahead when faced with requests from parents for IEEs at public expense in response to “limited” or “targeted” evaluations conducted by a district in between triennial reevaluations.

On September 23, 2020, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in McIntyre v. Eugene School District that the exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required when the claims do not allege a denial of a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) as defined by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). The case involved a student with attention deficit disorder who alleged that her school district violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act when it did not provide her with disability-related testing accommodations and failed to follow an emergency health protocol.

In the complaint, the student did not expressly allege a denial of FAPE. Instead, it alleged that the school district failed to provide her with reasonable accommodations and discriminated against her by failing to provide her with those reasonable accommodations and creating a hostile learning environment. The student was eligible for a Section 504 plan but did not have an individualized education program (“IEP”). The complaint did not seek compensatory education. Instead, it sought declaratory and injunctive relief, economic and noneconomic money damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

The student’s complaint was dismissed by the federal District Court, which relied upon the 2017 United States Supreme Court case Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools. The District Court interpreted the student’s complaint as primarily involving FAPE, and therefore exhaustion of administrative remedies was required. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit disagreed.

Instead, the Ninth Circuit found that the student’s Complaint sought relief for the denial of equal access to her education as opposed to a denial of FAPE. The Ninth Circuit relied upon the fact that the student did not have an IEP and that the testing accommodations and the health protocol in the Section 504 did not constitute special education for which FAPE is required.

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