By: Becky Batista, Law Clerk

Editor: Sanmathi (Sanu) Dev, Esq.

On March 17, 2022, the U.S. District Court of New Jersey affirmed the ruling of an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) in S.W. v. Elizabeth Board of Education that “transportation to and from the corner bus stop rather than from the disabled child’s home did not rise to the level of a denial of a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”), did not significantly impede the parents’ opportunity to participate relative to his education and did not cause a deprivation of educational benefits.”

In S.W., the parents of a disabled student sought compensatory education and a determination that the District denied their child a FAPE. For two consecutive academic school years, the student had an individualized education program (“IEP”) that reflected door-to-door transportation. Despite this provision in the IEP, each school year the parents were notified via letter from the District that the student’s designated bus stop location would be on the corner of their dead-end street and not their home. The parents would drive the student to the corner where he sat in the car until the bus arrived. After school, his parents would either pick him up or meet him at the corner. The parents did not dispute this discrepancy until September 2019 – three years later.

The parents’ attempt to reinstate the door-to-door transportation services with the District was unsuccessful. As a result, the parents filed a complaint with the Office of Special Education Policy and Dispute Resolution of the New Jersey Department of Education (“SPDR”). SPDR found that the district was non-compliant with the IEP as written and corrective action was required. Following these findings, the parties met for an IEP meeting in an attempt to resolve the issue of transportation for the student.  The meeting was unsuccessful and the parents filed for due process.

The ALJ heard the matter and rendered a final decision, concluding that the District did not deny the student a FAPE. The ALJ held that the parents were properly notified of the designated bus stop, and the District provided the student with transportation to and from school on the school bus, albeit from the corner bus stop. Thus, the student had access to an education. The ALJ also concluded that there was no evidence that an at-home stop was required to access an appropriate education. The parents appealed the ALJ’s decision to the District Court.

The District Court viewed the issue as a question of whether the District failed to properly implement the IEP when its bus driver picked up the disabled student at the corner rather than in front of his house, and if so, with what consequence. The Court concluded that the District failed to implement the transportation provision of the IEP, but such failure was de minimis and did not deprive the student of a FAPE. The Court explained that IDEA provides the District with flexibility to implement an IEP, and such flexibility is necessary here, where traffic safety concerns are implicated. The District’s policy is never to have a bus stop on a dead-end street that would require “backing” the bus, regardless of the type of bus. In addition, the Court noted that the student had access to an education and that “the medical and other evidence reviewed by the ALJ did not undermine the appropriateness of a corner bus stop.”  The Court stated that the door-to-door transportation was neither a substantial nor significant provision in the IEP. 

The parents also claimed that the change in transportation from door-to-door to the corner also changed the student’s educational placement in violation to the “stay put” provision of the IDEA. The “stay put provision” mandates that the child shall remain in his then-current educational placement during the pendency of any proceedings. However, the Court concluded that there was no evidence that pick-up/drop-off from the corner had a signification effect on the student’s learning experience, and therefore, the District did not violate the “stay put” provision of the IDEA.

By: Becky Batista, Law Clerk

Editor: Sanmathi (Sanu) Dev, Esq.

On March 3, 2022, the U.S. District Court of New Jersey approved a settlement agreement between a class of incarcerated students with disabilities and the New Jersey Department of Corrections (“DOC”) and New Jersey Department of Education (“DOE”) in Adam X. v. New Jersey Department of Corrections.

The plaintiffs filed a civil rights class action lawsuit on behalf of incarcerated disabled students in DOC adult prisons. These students were eligible for special education. They alleged that the DOC and DOE failed to provide special education or related services and equal education access to students with disabilities. As a result, they alleged that the students were denied a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 504”). They further alleged that the DOC and DOE denied disabled students equal access to the educational services and benefits offered and overseen by DOC and DOE in state prisons throughout New Jersey in violation of Title II of the Americans Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Section 504.

Prior to discovery, the Court appointed, with the Parties’ consent, a neutral and independent expert to review and evaluate both the DOC’s and DOE’s policies, practices, and procedures related to special education. Once the parties received the independent expert’s report, they entered into settlement negotiations. The parties finalized and signed the settlement agreement after over three years of negotiations. Finally, they requested the court to approve their settlement agreement.

Under this agreement, the DOC and DOE will modify their policies and procedures to ensure the development and implementation of individualized education programs (“IEPs”) and Section 504 plans for each eligible student, provide individualized transitions services, and provide at least four hours of instruction per day in a regular classroom setting to students with disabilities. The DOE must develop corrective action plans for the DOC for areas of non-compliance and will monitor to ensure implementation. Additionally, the agreement established a compensatory education program for eligible class members. The settlement agreement also includes other procedural provisions and provides for attorney’s fees.

A class action settlement may not be approved without a determination by the court that the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. The court considers the following: (1) complexity, expense, and likely duration of litigation; (2) the reaction of the class; (3) the stage of the proceeding and the amount of discovery completed; (4) the risk of establishing liability and damages; and (5) the risk of maintaining the class through trial.

The court recognized that this matter was not in its infancy. The matter was filed over five years ago and the parties negotiated at an arm’s length of three years with 30 settlement conferences and the exchange of 20,000 pages of documents before filing the agreement. Additionally, an independent expert spent 95 hours on-site evaluating the prisons’ special education-related policies and procedures, and there has been no objection from the any member of the class. The court also acknowledged that while it is unclear which party would be more likely to establish liability, the settlement agreement avoids time consuming and costly nature of litigation.

The court approved the settlement agreement in full, finding it was fair, adequate, and reasonable and would benefit the entire class by correcting violations and providing remedial opportunities for those already affected.

By: Becky Batista, Law Clerk

Editor: Sanmathi (Sanu) Dev, Esq.

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) permits any aggrieved party of an administrative finding to file an appeal in federal district court. Typically, an administrative finding is a final decision by an Administrative Law Judge on the substance and merits of an underlying due process petition brought by parents of a special education student against a public school district. On March 16, 2022, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued a precedential opinion in G.W. v. Ringwood Board of Education clarifying that the entry of a “Decision Approving Settlement” in an IDEA matter before the New Jersey Office of Administrative Law (“NJOAL”) does in fact satisfy the jurisdictional requirement permitting judicial review in district court. 

In G.W. v. Ringwood Board of Education, parents of a student with disabilities filed a due process petition against their school district under the IDEA. The matter was scheduled before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Prior to the scheduled due process hearing on the substance and merits of the case, the parties voluntarily entered into a settlement agreement. The ALJ then issued a “Decision Approving Settlement,” a common practice resolving special education disputes before the NJOAL. The parents later repudiated the settlement agreement, filed a motion before the ALJ to “set aside the agreement,” and filed a complaint in federal district court alleging that “they did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into the agreement.”

The federal district court considered this matter and raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte. The district court characterized the parents’ complaint as arising out of contract law, and denied the motion without prejudice. The court questioned whether the ALJ’s findings of a voluntary settlement agreement resolving all disputes between the parties satisfied the jurisdictional requirement of the IDEA. The district court ultimately concluded that jurisdiction was not provided by the provisions of the IDEA regarding the enforceability of settlements in federal court – such jurisdiction would be in state court. It further held that the decision was not based on “substantive grounds” and dismissed the matter without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The parents appealed the dismissal of their case to the Third Circuit.

The Third Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the matter pursuant to its opinion. The Court explained that Section 1415(f) of the IDEA permits challenges on due process hearing decisions, and this section “directs that ‘a decision made by a hearing officer shall be made on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the child received a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”).’” The Court determined that the ALJ’s Decision Approving Settlement was a substantive decision in this case by highlighting that the ALJ’s findings included: “(1) what the issues raised in the due process complaint were; (2) that there is an agreement whose terms resolve the issues raised; (3) that the parties mutually assented to that settlement agreement; and (4) that the agreement’s material terms comply with the IDEA’s mandate that participating school districts provide students with disability a FAPE.” The Court also mentioned that the ALJ’s final order in this matter incorporated the agreed terms, which addressed the provision of the child’s FAPE, and informed the parties of their rights to appeal.

The Court plainly stated that a party is considered aggrieved “by the findings and decision of an ALJ when they articulate a challenge to the ALJ’s basis for entry of a final administrative order.” As a result of this case, voluntary special education settlement agreements which are approved by an ALJ of the NJOAL are now appealable to federal district court.